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1.  Introduction 
The advances in biotechnology provide a fast and dependable method of 
producing a plant with specific, desirable traits, so called genetically modified (GM) 
crops.  While demand-side concerns remain a controversial issue, the world had seen a 
rapid growth in GM crops planted both in the developed and developing countries.  Cost, 
yield and risk considerations have provided the supply side with strong incentives to 
adopt (Kalaitzandonakes 1999).  In 1996 GM crops were first introduced for commercial 
production in 4.2 million acres in six countries. By 2002, GM crops grew to a total of 145 
million acres in sixteen countries on six continents or 22% of the world’s total cropland, a 
35-fold increase in 7 years.  The US is the largest adopter with 96.3 million acres, 
following by Argentina with 33.3 million acres, Canada with 8.6 million acres and China 
with 5.2 million acres in 2002.  These four countries grow 99% of the global GM 
cropland.  
  Unlike a product innovation where the innovated product could be manufactured 
and sold to the consumers directly, the commercial value of genes is realized only 
through the sale of the GM plant in which the genes are incorporated with some basic 
germplasm.  Under current patent law, both genes and the basic seed germplasm are 
patentable. Therefore, plant breeders need to make licensing deals for the desired genes if 
they would like to develop a GM seed with that gene.  For example, Monsanto produces 
branded GM seeds with its YieldGard Bt gene and RR herbicide tolerance gene, 
individually or in a stacked system.  It also licenses its genes to other breeders.  
Syngenta’s seeds use a Bt gene from Monsanto and herbicide tolerance gene from Bayer   3
Crop Science.  There are other possible players in this market.  For example, if the trait 
provides a substitute for certain type of insecticide, the insecticide manufacturers get 
involved.  If the trait is herbicide tolerance, the herbicide producers get involved, as their 
products are complementary to the gene. 
The 1990s have seen a substantial number of mergers and acquisitions, and an 
increase in vertical and horizontal integration in the seed and pesticide industries. The 
four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) is 47% for pesticides industry in 1997, 21% for seed 
industry in 1999, and 100% for plant biotechnology industry in 1998.  The concentration 
is higher in some specific markets.  For instance, in 1998, Monsanto and Pioneer-HiBred 
(now owned wholly by DuPont) controlled 11% and 39% of the US seed corn market, 
respectively.  For the US cotton market, two companies, Delta&Pine Land and 
Stoneville, had 71% and 16%, respectively, of the seed market (Hayenga and 
Kalaitzandonakes 1999).  The concentration at the R&D stage is matched by 
concentration in terms of the number of patents held.  The top four firms held 41% of the 
corn patents in 1996, 53% of the soybean patents in 1997, 77% of the tomato patents in 
1997 and 38% of the Bt patents in 1998 (Graff et al. 2003).  The major biotechnology 
companies are increasingly purchasing these seed companies as a source of seed material 
in which to insert the genes for input or output traits.  For example, in 1997, Monsanto 
acquired a 30% share of the Brazilian corn seed market with the acquisition of Sementes 
Agroceres.  With its 1998 purchase of Cargill’s international seed division, Monsanto 
now controls over half the Argentine maize seed market.     4
  The increasing vertical integrated industry structure may be affected by many 
factors. Rausser et al. (1999) argues that the restructuring has been technologically 
driven.  In particular there may exist factors associated with the complementary assets 
and substitutability in agricultural biotechnology products, and those connected with 
intellectual property rights (e.g. Graff et al. 2002, Rausser et al. 1999).  Intellectual 
property rights create pressures for greater vertical integration and strategic alliances and 
contracting, depending on the nature of the intellectual property and the rights associated 
with it.  If IPR are well defined and transaction costs are low, contracting and strategic 
alliances are more likely.  However, if IPR are not well defined, biotech companies might 
buy out seed companies rather than license genes to them.  Vertical integration via 
consolidation may also be driven by parties’ heterogeneous beliefs regarding the 
profitability of the industry (Goodhue et al. 2002).   
  This paper is motivated by the effort to examine the strategic incentive for 
licensing versus integrating forward, given the institutional structure and various relevant 
markets in the agricultural biotechnology industry. In the agricultural biotechnology 
industry, a common phenomenon is that a biotech company integrates with the seed 
sector and the chemical sector, while it also licenses its technology (gene) to other 
competitors.  There are loose arguments in the existing literature that the vertical 
integration occurring in the agricultural biotechnology industry is motivated by strategic 
considerations.  We formalize an analysis of the strategic incentives of partially 
integrating forward, in the specific case of GM seeds and the related chemical sectors.    5
This topic is important for policy maker and regulator who concern about the 
anticompetitive issues.   
The paper is organized as the following: after the introduction, we develop a 
model for analyzing the licensing and vertical integration behavior among the gene 
holder and breeders.  We then investigate the case where the gene is a chemical substitute 
and the case where the gene is a chemical complement, followed by a concluding 
discussion. 
 
2.  Model 
  In the basic model, the production process involves trait development through 
gene innovation and seed production.  We assume that, at this moment, firm A holds the 
patent for a specific gene, and the seed industry is duopoly in the short run.  Thus, firms 
B1 and B2 (breeders) may produce and sell the basic seeds and the GM seeds if they get 
license of the gene from firm A.  This gene could be any of the following two types: (1) 
gene as a substitute for a chemical input e.g. Bt gene, (2) gene as a complement to a 
chemical input, e.g. RR gene.  Production of basic seed involves fixed entry costs Ki, and 
a marginal cost of ci for firm i, i = B1, B2.  The production of GM seed involves a very 
small marginal cost of inserting the gene into the seed, which is normalized to be zero.  
Both licensing negotiation and vertical integration involves certain amount of costs, 
which we denote as Kl and Kv, respectively. 
  The competition in the seed market is modeled as a three-stage game.  In the first 
stage, firm A decides and commits whether to integrate forward and/or the number of   6
licenses to the breeders.  In the second stage, firms A and B1, B2 decide simultaneous 
which products to offer; firms B1 and B2 decide whether to take the licensing offer if 
firm A decides to license its technology, and the negotiation incurs cost Kl.  If firm A 
does integrate forward, then Kv is sunk.  In the last stage, firms A, B1 and B2 
simultaneously choose prices for their respective products. 
  Farmers are heterogeneous seed buyers.  The heterogeneity of farmers relates to 
many factors.  Such factors may include the acreage susceptibility to infestation, cropping 
history, husbandry practices, managerial skills, weather conditions, and soil types.  We 
capture such heterogeneity through a continuously distributed infestation severity index, 
θ.  θ is uniformly distributed over [0, 1].  Farmers are risk neutral and they know their 
types right before planting.  
  We also assume that each indexed farmer holds only one unit of cropland and 
only demands one unit of seed.  Therefore, a farmer with a big farm could be viewed as 
several indexed farmers with their corresponding types. Farmers have zero value of the 
extra unit of seeds.  The indexed farmers are with total measure 1. 
  There are a total of four possible products in the market, two GM seeds and two 
basic seeds (B1 and B2).  We denote the GM seed with gene A being inserted into B1 
seed as A/B1 and the GM seed with gene A being inserted into B2 seed as A/B2.  A farmer 
of type θ has a valuation of vBi(θ) for a unit of basic seed Bi, and a valuation of vA/Bi(θ) 
for a unit of GM seed A/Bi, where i = 1, 2.  These values are net of the costs of buying 
and applying the chemical but gross of the costs of seeds.     7
  Since the gene is input related, farmers’ decision making needs to take into 
account of the price of the related inputs, which are exogenous unless specified else.  
Figure 1 to 2 illustrate farmers’ decision making for the two types of genes we introduced 
earlier.   
 
3.  Analysis of chemical substitute gene 
  Figure 1 illustrates the case where the gene provides a substitute for certain 
insecticide.  Farmers choose one of the three strategies: a) do nothing; b) spray 
insecticide after the emergence of infestation, a self-protection approach; and c) plant 
GM seed, a self-insurance approach.  
 
Assumptions:  
1.  Three firms: firm A owns the gene, firm B1 and B2 owns basic seed germplasms. 
Products are denoted by A, B1, and B2; 
2.  Marginal cost of producing B1, B2 and the GM seed are equal, c1 = c2 = cGM = c; 
3.  Production of basic seed involves fixed costs Ki, i = B1, B2. Licensing and vertical 
merger involve costs Kl, Kv, respectively; 
4.  Farmers differ by type θ.  θ is uniformly distributed over [0, 1] with measure 1; 
5.  A farmer of type θ has an expected reservation value of vBi_a(θ) = w – α1θ, for a unit 
of basic seed Bi if adopting strategy a (“do nothing”), and vBi_b(θ) = w – f - α2θ, if 
adopting strategy b (“apply insecticide later”). α1 >α2 > 0, f > 0, and α1 > α2 + f; 
6.  A farmer of type θ has a reservation value of vA/Bi(θ) = w, for a unit of GM seed A/Bi;   8
7.  Output price and other inputs prices (other than the seed price) are exogenous. 
 
  Assumption 2, 5, and 6 imply that the basic seeds B1 and B2 are perfect 
substitutes.  Thus we omit the subscript in figure 1.  Line (a) in the graph represents the 
farmers’ expected virtual cost of adopting strategy a, PB + α1θ.  The farmer of type 0 gets 
surplus of w – PB.  A farmer of type θ gets expected surplus of w – PB – α1θ. 
  If the farmer chooses strategy b, he plants the basic seeds and applies insecticide 
after the infestation occurs.  We assume that the output value is recovered fully by 
applying insecticides. The farmer incurs a cost per acre of (f + α2θ), where f is the fixed 
cost per unit land of spraying the chemical, and α2θ is the expected market cost of the 
chemical to eliminate type θ infestation.  A farmer of type 0 gets surplus of w – PB – f.  A 
farmer of type θ gets expected surplus of w – PB – f – α2θ.  Line (b) illustrates the 
expected virtual cost of strategy b, PB + f + α2θ.   
  If the farmer chooses strategy c, he plants the GM seed, and pays the premium at 
time 0 (PA/B > PB). The GM seed eliminate infestation if it occurs.  The farmer gets 
surplus of w – PA/B, which is invariant over types. Therefore, the virtual cost of strategy c, 
line (c), is a horizontal line at PA/B.  
  Figure 1 (I) is the case where three groups of farmers are observed while (II) is 
the case where only two groups of farmers are observed. θij denotes the farmer’ type who 
is indifferent between choosing strategy i and j.  In panel (I), farmers whose type is 
smaller than θab will choose strategy a.  Farmers with types greater than θbc will choose   9
strategy c.  Those lying in the interval (θab, θbc) choose strategy b.  Thus, if θab > θbc, then 
farmers would rather choose between a and c, which is depicted in panel (II). 
 
Figure 1. Farmers’ purchasing decision, gene as chemical substitute, given PB, PA/B, 























PB +f  
+α2 
1  0 
(c): PA/B 
(b): PB +f  +α2θ  (a): PB + α1θ 
Do nothing A pply insecticide later Purchase GM seed 
θab 





1  0 
(c): PA/B 
(b): PB +f  +α2θ 
(a): PB + α1θ 
Do nothing  Purchase GM seed






PA/B   10
The Equilibrium 
  As discussed earlier, we model the production and pricing decisions of firms A, 
B1 and B2 as a three-stage game. Stage1: firm A chooses vertically integration and/or 
licensing; Stage 2: firms A and B1, B2 decide simultaneous which products to offer; 
Stage 3: firms A, B1 and B2 chooses prices for their products. We solve for the 
equilibrium using the method of backward induction.  Without loss of generality, we 
assume that if there is only one GM seed, then it is made of A and B1. 
 
Step 1. Market equilibrium in stage 3. 
  In the subgame where the product set is (A/B1, B2), a farmer of type θ gets the 
surplus from different strategies as follows: 
a)  w - α1θ – PB,  
b)  w – f - α2θ – PB,  
c)   w – PA/B. 
A farmer of type θ will choose  
  Strategy (a): plant basic seed and use no insecticide later iff 
  (IC)  w  –α1θ - PB ≥ max [w - PA/B, w- f - α2θ - PB] 
  (IR) w –α1θ - PB ≥ 0; 
  Strategy (b): plant basic seed and apply insecticide later iff   
  (IC)  w- f - α2θ  - PB ≥ max [w - PA/B, w  –α1θ - PB] 
  (IR) w- f - α2θ - PB ≥ 0; 
  Strategy c): plant GM seed and use no insecticide iff   11
  (IC)  w - PA/B  ≥ max [w- f - α2θ - PB, w – α1θ – PB] 
  (IR) w - PA/B ≥ 0. 
The incentive compatibility (IC) constraints suggest that if a farmer chooses a strategy, it 
must be true that the farmer derives more surplus from that strategy than from any of the 
other two strategies. The individual rationality (IR) constraints suggest that the farmers 
must be better off adopting that strategy than giving up farming.  We assume w is big 
enough such that IR constraints are always not binding, i.e. the market is fully covered. 
  Therefore, by setting IC constraints binding, we find the critical value of θ’s, 
where a farmer of type θab is indifferent between choosing strategy a and b, θbc for 
strategy b and c, and θac for strategy a and c.   
θab,= f/(α1 - α2), 
θbc = [(PA/B - PB) – f]/α2. 
θac = (PA/B - PB)/α1. 
  We first assume that θab < θac < θbc, as illustrated in figure 1 panel (I).  We 
observe three groups of farmers.  Hence, the demand for the basic seeds are θbc and the 
demand for the GM seed are (1 - θbc).  Therefore, the gene/breeder’s problem is to choose 
PA/B to 
 Max  π = (PA/B – c)(1-θbc). 
Firm B2’s problem is to choose PB to 
 Max  π = (PB – c)θbc.   12
The first order conditions of above profit functions give the following best response 
functions, 
PA/B (PB) = 0.5(PB + f + c + α2), 
PB(PA/B) =0.5(PA/B + c – f]. 
Therefore, the equilibrium prices and profits, gross of the fixed costs, are 
P*A/B = 1/3(f +3 c + 2α2), 
P*B =1/3(α2 + 3c – f]. 
πA/B = (f + 2α2)
2/9α2, 
πB2 = (α2- f)
2/9α2. 
  In order for θbc > 0 (i.e. ensure the existence of strategy b farmers), we must have 
(PA/B - PB) – f > 0.  Thus, it must be that P*A/B – P*B > f ⇒α2 > f.  Thus, P*B =1/3(α2 + 
3c – f] > c, the basic seed price is above the marginal cost. 
  Now let’s suppose that the subgame is (A/B1, B1, B2).  The basic seed price is 
driven down to the marginal price.  Therefore, the market equilibrium is, P*A/B = 1/2(f +2 
c + α2), P*B = c, πA/B = (f + α2)
2/4α2, πB2 = 0. 
  If the subgame is (A/B1, B1), the monopoly prices and profits will be P*A/B = P*B 
= w, πA/B = (w – c), πB2 = 0.  It can be verified that the monopoly profit is higher than 
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Step 2. Compare the payoffs and choose stage 2 strategy. 
Lemma 1.  Post-entry equilibrium: At the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of subgame 
with product set (A/B1, B2), PB > c, and both firms earn more than in the subgame with 
product set (A/B1, B1, B2). 
Proof: The intuition behind lemma 1 is straightforward.  If there are two incumbents in 
the basic seed market, Bertrand competition leads to zero profits if the two basic seeds 
are perfect substitutes.  If gene holder reach exclusive licensing deals or vertically 
integrated forward with one of the basic seed company, bundling (supplying the GM seed 
only) create product differentiation.  Therefore the price of the basic seed could be raised 
above the marginal cost.  Firm B2 makes positive profits even its market size is smaller 
than before.  Meanwhile, the GM seed supplier is happy to see the increased price of the 
basic seed, as it means that their products are relatively “cheaper” than before.  They 
could raise the price of GM seed while having a bigger market share.  Thus in the 
equilibrium, both firms are better off.  The result is driven by the fact that by committing 
to pure bundling (A/B1), the basic seed market is less competitive.  This intuition applies 
to the case where farmers either purchase GM seeds or plant the basic seed and do 
nothing (Figure 1, panel II).  The necessary and sufficient condition is θbc ≤ θab ⇒ (PA/B - 
PB) ≥ fα1/(α1 - α2), The critical value of farmer’s type is θac. We may show that firms are 
still better off when the gene/breeder commit to the GM seed only and firm B2 commit to 
the basic seed only.  Lemma 1 still holds. QED.   14
Lemma 2. Pre-entry Equilibrium: Firm A/B1 would like to deter firm B2’s entry to the 
basic seed market.  The deterrence may be done through unbundling commitment, selling 
(A/B1, B1). 
Proof:  Without loss of generality, we assume that firm A and firm B1 reach exclusive 
agreement before firm B2 decides on entering the basic market or not.  If firm B2 does 
not enter the basic seed market, firm A/B1 will do best as a monopolist (earning the 
highest payoff).  Since firm B2 incurs a fixed entry cost K to the basic seed market, it will 
enter the market only if the payoff could cover the entry cost.  Our analysis above shows 
that bundling (selling GM only) will raise firm B2’s payoff compared to unbundling 
(selling both GM and the basic seed) where firm B2 earns zero.  Thus, bundling serves as 
an entry encourage mechanism. QED. 
Lemma 3.  Breeders will only take the exclusive license if the basic seeds are perfect 
substitutes to the farmer. 
Proof:  Now we consider licensing only.  If the license is nonexclusive, and l is the 
licensing fee, the subgame is either (A/B1, A/B2, B1, B2), or (A/B1, A/B2). The unique 
pure strategy Nash equilibrium is for each firm to charge P*A/B = c + l, P*B = c, πB1 = πB2 
= 0, πA = l*(1-θbc).  Firms B1 and B2 obtain zero profits, while they incur the extra 
negotiation cost of Kl.  Therefore they are not going to take the non-exclusive offer. 
QED.   
  Lemma 3 suggests that if the breeder does not think the gene holder could 
credibly commit to exclusively licensing the technology, it may turn down the licensing 
offer even if it is in the name of “exclusive”.  Therefore, the gene holder has to use   15
vertical merger to acquire access to the basic seed germplasm in order to commercialized 
its gene innovation.  
Lemma 4. Whether there exist markets for insecticide (strategy b) depends on the prices 
of the basic seed and the GM seed, and the price of the insecticide, and does not depend 
on the severity of infestation. 
Proof: Market for insecticide exists only if θab < θbc (see figure 2.1). Since θab,= f/(α1 - 
α2), θbc = [(PA/B - PB) – f]/α2, the demand for the insecticide will be greater if: 1) the more 
expensive the GM seed is relative to the basic seed, or 2) the cheaper the insecticide is 
(α2 smaller), or 3) the cheaper the fixed cost of insecticide application is (f smaller). For 
example, if θab > θbc, reduction in insecticide price will tilt down line (b), which will 
drive θab to the left of θbc.  This is consistent to the observation that since the adoption of 
Bt crops, the market price of insecticide has dropped by about one half. QED. 
 
Step 3. Determine stage 1 strategy. 
  From lemmas 1 and 3, we have the following: 
Proposition 1. At the pure-strategy equilibrium of the full model, if the breeders are in 
the basic market already, the gene holder always vertically integrated with one of the 
breeders, either via exclusive licensing, or via acquisition. The integrated firm always 
provides GM seed only. The unintegrated firm sells all the basic seeds.   
  The intuition of proposition 1 is as follows.  When a new technology is available, 
the innovator wishes to have as many as possible applications if the royalty rate is fixed.  
However, no breeder is interested in introducing the new product if it expects its rival to   16
do so.  In the breeder’s market, the current competition already left the breeders with zero 
profits.  If a breeder expects its rival to take the license, it will also expect the rival to 
supply only GM seeds and it will be made better off by earning positive profits.  The 
unlicensed breeder does not want to take the license to destroy the product differentiation 
just established.  Therefore, it will not take the offer if it expects its rival to do so.  The 
innovator encourages adoption by offering exclusive license or integrating forward with 
one of the incumbents.  The welfare effects are ambiguous.  While the basic seed farmers 
are worse off as they face with a higher seed cost, the users of the new technology are 
better off, because they have a choice of the new variety. 
 
Proposition 2. If an integrated firm is about to introduce a GM seed to a new market, it 
will introduce both the GM seed and the basic seed so as to foreclose the new market 
from any potential entry. 
  Proposition 2 is essentially developed from lemma 2.  Since Bertrand competition 
will serve as a strong entry deterrence device, the unbundling strategy (selling both the 
GM seed and basic seed) will be preferred by the incumbent integrated firm. 
  The advent of the new technology, GM seed will decrease the demand for 
insecticide.  Demand for insecticide decrease from (1-θab) to (θbc -θab).  Moreover, those 
users who switches to GM seeds are also farmers with heavy demand for insecticide 
when GM seed is not available.  Therefore, we have the following proposition: 
   17
Proposition 3.  The insecticide producer has incentive to integrate forward with the 
gene/breeder and supplies only GM seed.  
Proof.  We examine the profits/joint profits of the insecticide producer and gene/breeder 
under different strategies.  For simplicity, we assume the insecticide production cost be 
zero, and the insecticide producer is a monopolist.  We argue that if the gene/breeder 
integrates with the insecticide producer, and supply the GM seed only, its payoff will be 
maximized. 
  Market for insecticide exists only if θab < θbc (see figure 1), where θab,= f/(α1 - 
α2), and θbc = [(PA/B - PB) – f]/α2.  The integrated firm’s problem is to  
  If the integrated firm supplies both the GM and the basic seeds, PB = c.  The 
equilibrium prices and profits are P*A/B = c + α2, P*B = c, πA/B = f + (α2 – f)
2/2α2 – α2 
f
2/[2(α1 – α2)
2], and πB2 = 0. 
  If the integrated firm supplies only GM seed, then the equilibrium prices and 
profits are solved as P*A/B = 1/3(f +3 c + 3α2), P*B =1/3(1.5α2 + 3c – f], πA/B = (α2 + 
f/3)(0.5α2 + f/3)/α2 + (α2 – 2f/3)
2/2α2 – α2 f
2/[2(α1 – α2)
 2], and πB2 = (0.5α2 – f/3)
2/α2. 
  Recall the equilibrium when the subgame is (A/B1, B2), and the pesticide firm is 
not integrated with the gene/breeders,  P*A/B = 1/3(f +3 c + 2α2), P*B =1/3(α2 + 3c – f]. 
πA/B = (f + 2α2)
2/9α2, and πB2 = (α2- f)
2/9α2. 
  Comparing the three equilibrium outcomes, when firms integrate and supply only 
GM seed, both GM seed price and the basic seed price are strictly greater than those 
. ) 1 )( ( 2 /
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obtained when the chemical sector is not integrated.  The joint profits of the gene/breeder 
and the insecticide producer are greater too.  The insecticide producer has incentive to 
integrate forward as long as the additional joint profits will be greater than the integration 
costs.  QED. 
  The intuition of proposition 2 is as the following.  The insecticide sale will go up 
if farmers who use strategy a switch to b, i.e. θab shifts to the left, or farmers who use 
strategy c switch to b, i.e. θbc shifts to the right. θab and θbc is determined by the GM seed 
price premium over the basic seed and the insecticide prices. The integrated firm’s first 
order condition of its profit maximization includes the term for the seed market and the 
term for the insecticide market.  If the firm raises the GM seed price by one unit, it would 
drive θbc to the right, which means that the insecticide revenue will increase, and sales in 
the GM seed market may go down.  The gain in the insecticide sector partially offsets the 
loss in the GM sale. Therefore, the integrated firm has more incentive to price GM seed 
less aggressively.  On the other hand, the insecticide price is unlikely to go down, 
because if it does, the lower price will cause θbc shifting to the right, the price decrease in 
insecticide is at an extra cost of loss in the GM market.  As a consequence, the optimal 
price of GM seed is almost always higher and the joint profits will be higher.  The switch 
point of strategy a and b, θab, is determined by the relative slope of the damage function 
and the insecticide spraying cost.  Price of the basic seed won’t affect it.  Therefore, there 
is no incentive for the integrated firm to drive down the basic seed price.  The integrated 
firm would still prefer exclusively licensing and pure bundling, i.e. it supplies only the 
GM seed.   19
4.  Analysis of chemical complement gene 
  The analysis of the case where the gene is a chemical complement follows almost 
the same approach as in the previous section.  Figure 2 illustrates the case where the gene 
serves as a complementary product for certain herbicide.  Farmers have three strategies 
available: a) do nothing; b) spray herbicide at time 0, a self-insurance approach; and c) 
plant GM seed and apply herbicide later, a self-protection approach.   
  If the farmer chooses strategy a, he does nothing to control the weed.  The 
expected damage caused by infestation for a farmer of type θ is D(θ), where D(0) = 0, 
D’(θ) > 0.  A farmer of type 0 gets surplus of w – PB.  A farmer of type θ gets expected 
surplus of w – PB – D(θ).  Line (a) is the expected virtual cost of strategy a, PB + D(θ).    
  If the farmer chooses strategy b, he treats the cropland at time 0, which is 
assumed to ensure weed-free later.  Farmers could not apply herbicide later after the crop 
sibling comes out, as it will kill both the weed and the crop.  The amount of herbicide 
used in the pre-emergence treatment, s, is assumed to be fixed and invariant over types. 
The farmer incurs a total cost per acre of (f + s), where f > 0 is the fixed cost per unit land 
of spraying the crop, and s > 0 is the market cost of the chemical for pre-emergence 
treatment. The farmer gets surplus of w – PB – f – s, which is invariant over types. 
Therefore, line (b), the virtual cost of strategy b, is a horizontal line at PB + f + s. 
  If the farmer choose strategy c, he pays the premium at the beginning (PB < PA/B) 
and the GM seed enables him to apply the herbicide later according to level of weed 
grown in the field. He incurs an expected cost per acre of (f + s(θ)), where f > 0 is the 
fixed cost per acre of spraying  the crop, and s(θ)>0 is the expected market cost of the   20
chemical applied by farmer of type θ, and s(0) = 0, D’(θ) > s’(θ) > 0.  A farmer of type 0 
gets surplus of w – PA/B – f.  A farmer of type θ gets expected surplus of w – PA/B – f – 
s(θ).  Line (c) is the expected virtual cost of strategy c), PA/B + f + s(θ).  Line (c) touches 
the right-hand-side axis at PA/B + f + s(1). 
 
Figure 2. Farmers’ purchasing decisions, gene as chemical complement, given PB, 
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  Figure 2 (I) is the case where three groups of farmers are observed while (II) is 
the case where only two groups of farmers are observed.  In panel (I), farmers with type 
lower than θac will choose strategy a.  Farmers with types greater than θbc will choose 
strategy b.  Those lies in (θac, θbc) chooses strategy b.  Thus, if θac > θbc, then farmers 
would rather choose between a and b, which is depicted in panel (II). 
  Farmers adopt strategy a when the infestation severity index is close to zero, and 
choose to treat the cropland before the weed emergence when the infestation severity 
index is close to the upper bound.  The introduction of herbicide tolerance GM seed has 
both plus and minus effect on the total use of chemical.  The dominant effect is 
determined by the relative density distribution of the farmer’s type. The GM seed 
adoption increases the consumption of the chemical by farmers with types in (θac, θab).  
Without the GM seeds, these groups of farmers choose “doing nothing”.  It also decreases 
the consumption of the chemical by farmers with types in (θab, θbc).  This group of 
farmers used to adopt the “pre-emergence treatment” strategy, in which all the cropland is 
treated equally and to the maximum effective extent.  With GM seed, the chemical is 
applied according to the level of weed occurred, therefore less chemical is needed for the 
treatment of these lands.  The dominant effect is determined by the relative density 
distribution of farmers in those two regions and their level of chemical usage.  On the 
other hand, since the GM technology virtually ties the chemical use to the seed, the 
chemical producer of that certain herbicide gains the whole market of (θab, θbc).  The loss 
in (θab, θbc) due to farmers’ switch from strategy b to c is shared by all the suppliers in the   22
chemical market if it is highly competitive.  Therefore, the tied herbicide producer’s sale 
will boost in general. 
  The trait royalty (or technology fee) will affect the demand for the GM seed.  If 
the premium is lower, then [θac,θbc] is wider.  If the chemical producer integrates with the 
gene/breeder, then it captures its rent either via the sale of the chemical or via the sale of 
GM seeds.  If it has market power in the chemical sector (for example, it holds a unique 
patent of that chemical), then we argue that it will reap the rent from the chemical sale.  A 
higher chemical price shifts line (b) up and tilts line (c) up in figure 2.   If, however, the 
chemical sector is highly competitive (for example, the patent on the herbicide is 
expired), then an increase in the integrated firm’s chemical price will not affect line (b) 
very much.  The integrated firm would reap the rent from the GM seed sale (increasing 
prices of GM seed, while keeping the chemical price low). 
  
5.  Summary and conclusions 
The study is motivated by an effort to understand the observed substantially 
increasing vertical and horizontal integration in the seed and pesticide industries since the 
1990s.  While the existing literature argues that the concentration may be driven by 
technology factor, by intellectual property pressure, or by parties’ heterogeneous belief, 
we try to investigate it from the strategic perspective. We develop a simple model in 
which the basic seeds are perfect substitute and the breeder market is oligopolistic, and 
examine the case where the gene is a chemical substitute and the case where the gene is a 
chemical complement.     23
We find that if the market already exists, i.e. the breeders are already in the 
market, then the dominant strategy for the gene holder is to exclusively license to one of 
the breeders and commit to bundling by selling only the GM seed. If the exclusive 
commitment is not credible to the breeder such that it declines the licensing offer, the 
gene holder will integrate forward with one of the breeder in order to commercialize its 
gene innovation. If, however, that the market does not exist, i.e. the breeders need to bear 
entry cost if they decide to enter the new market, then the gene holder’s dominant 
strategy is to integrate with a breeder and commit to unbundling, i.e. selling both GM 
seed and the basic seed in the new market.  The potential entrants would be deterred 
because of the suicidal price competition if they choose to enter.  If the gene is a chemical 
complement, then the chemical firm has strong incentive to integrate forward with the 
gene holder/breeder.  Whether the integrated firm will reap the rent through the sale of 
the chemical or the sale of the GM seed depends on the market competition level in the 
chemical sector and the distribution of farmer’s type. 
This paper, however, is subject to several limitations, which also imply our future 
studies.  Our analysis has been made on speculation of the relevant market.  An empirical 
study on the relevant market, including the product scope and geographic locations, will 
be very helpful for improving our analytical model.  Secondly, the simple model 
presented here may be not enough to examine the trade-off between licensing and 
integration forward in the more relevant case, where the basic seeds are most likely 
differentiated for farmers.  Moreover, we would like to find out whether there exists 
parameter spaces that integrating (bundling) plus licensing becomes the dominant   24
strategy.  In another word, the gene company may integrate forward partially so as to 
commit to “bundling”.  With the commitment in place, the seed companies may find it 
optimal to accept the licensing offers, which would be otherwise suboptimal. 
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